Jonathan Edwards against Arminianism
Book Review on “Jonathan Edwards against Arminianism” by James A. Harris
In his Oxford publication, Of Liberty and Necessity, James A. Harris', Jonathan Edwards against Arminianism, surveys the 18th-century free will debate in British philosophy. Harris is a lecturer and professor in philosophy and writes for Cambridge University Press and the new Oxford History of Philosophy. Harris contrasts Edwards’ notion of free will in his writing with his contemporaries, including John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Clarke, and Anthony Collins. Harris analyzes Jonathan Edwards’ primary publication on free will entitled, A Careful and strict Enquiry into The modern prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, Which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame. Edwards maintains a traditional Calvinistic view and frames his position not simply as philosophical but as the underpinning and essence of Christianity. By examining the refutation of libertarianism, Harris concludes that Edwards does not altogether adopt the notion of experimentalism through Lockean philosophy nor the necessitarianism of Hobbes; instead, it is through occasionalism that Edwards rescinds Arminianism.
American intellectual and historian Perry Miller claimed in 1949 that Jonathan Edwards followed a Lockean approach to his refutation against Arminianism. Locke undoubtedly influenced Edwards, as Edwards explicitly states his intrigue when reading Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. Locke's naturalistic philosophy helped Edwards frame the supernatural and "divine element" of God and free will to a more "naturalized" and integrated view of the world. Edwards found his starting point in Locke's understanding of the will, only to expand further with contributing thoughts from the influence of others such as Hobbes, Collins and Cambridge Platonists. Edwards takes an priori position contrary to Lockean philosophy and experimentalism, asserting that theory and knowledge are obtained only through experience.
Edwards will establish his refutation of libertarianism by breaking down the Arminian position into three parts: (1) self-determining power, (2) indifference, and (3) contingence. Arminianism affirms humanity's power and will above the authority and sovereignty of God. Edwards first emphasizes the instability of the Arminian position by stating, "either the Arminian is saying something self-contradictory; or he is without acknowledging it, in agreement with the Calvinist." He asserts that Arminians and Calvinists begin on the mutual understanding that humans possess the power to will in the sense of taking action of the will. Through Locke, Edwards establishes that the differences in action lie in the motivations and causes. For the Calvinist, all choices are influenced by the choice prior to it and originate in the "first act." Locke will address the power of suspension, but Edwards will refute this notion as this act has no freedom; it simply elongates the inevitable.
Libertarianism claims "that a free act does not have a cause;" however, according to Edwards, the will cannot remain neutral, nor can it "equally prefer" two options, as stated by Isaac Watts, as there would be no purpose in determination. As Hume and Kames further the notion of "feelings of indifference," Edwards will refute the claims asserting the incoherence, "for they would be giving an account of some ground of the existence of a thing when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground of its existence." Like Hobbes and Collins, Edwards will affirm causal relation – that the cause will entirely determine the effect; this notion has no partiality. Clarke and Edwards also agree that human choice only occurs through prior understandings influencing motives, as Edwards believes "indifference, without motives, is incoherent." Edwards will, in part, agree with some notions within necessitarianism, the principle that the will is determined by prior events, decisions and choices.
Edwards emphasizes the distinction between moral and natural causes while preserving moral responsibility, which is also found in Hobbes's position. He furthers Hobbes's claim that the influence of all causes is in the imperfection of human nature, and natural philosophy has a basis for the effects of original sin. Though Hobbes claims God is remote and will ignore human suffering, Edwards contrarily establishes God's active work in humanity. The inconsistencies in Hobbes and Edwards lead Harris to believe Edwards would instead identify as an occasionalist like Berkeley. While the predominant philosophers in 18th-century Britain sought to establish thought outside the paradigm of God, divinity, and tradition, Edwards asserts that everything is dependent on divine will, and humans are inherently reliant on God. He sought to increase humanity's reliance on the grace of God, emphasizing man's original sin and the "active force" and providence of God.
Harris does an exceptional job of extracting Edwards’s ideas and contrasting them with other philosophers of his time. Harris is well versed in the array of perspectives and figures of 18th-century philosophers in Britain, especially Locke, Hume and Descartes, and others such as Kames, Berkeley, and Wesley. A focal point is placed on Locke’s experimentalism, as Harris’ overarching theme of his book, Of Liberty and Necessity, constructs a theory that the 18th-century British understanding of free will largely depends on human experience. However, although Locke influences Edwards’ philosophy, Harris concludes that Edwards’ position is vastly different from the notion of experimentalism. Harris continues to establish that Edwards is also not compatible with Hobbes and states in passing that Edwards is much more similar to Berkeley but fails to further expand on their commonalities. It would benefit the reader to learn more about Berkeley and the occasionalist notion, as Harris states that Edwards’s philosophy aligns here.
Furthermore, unlike the philosophers at the time (such as Price, Beattie, Reid, and Stewart), who did not care to engage with Edwards’ arguments, Harris asserts Edwards’ position as “such a powerful one,” worthy of an address by his contemporaries. Harris resolutely interacts and analyzes Edwards’s notion against Arminianism, correcting authors such as Miller and his appeal to label Edwards simply as Lockean. Given Harris’s knowledge of the philosophical positions of the 18th-century, this invites the question of how he would suppose the predominant philosophers would engage with Edwards’s arguments and defend their positions. Overall, Harris’ comprehensive analysis of 18th-century British phiilosophers provides a robust presentation of the contributing philosophies and unique position Edwards held against
In his Oxford publication, Of Liberty and Necessity, James A. Harris', Jonathan Edwards against Arminianism, surveys the 18th-century free will debate in British philosophy. Harris is a lecturer and professor in philosophy and writes for Cambridge University Press and the new Oxford History of Philosophy. Harris contrasts Edwards’ notion of free will in his writing with his contemporaries, including John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Clarke, and Anthony Collins. Harris analyzes Jonathan Edwards’ primary publication on free will entitled, A Careful and strict Enquiry into The modern prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, Which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame. Edwards maintains a traditional Calvinistic view and frames his position not simply as philosophical but as the underpinning and essence of Christianity. By examining the refutation of libertarianism, Harris concludes that Edwards does not altogether adopt the notion of experimentalism through Lockean philosophy nor the necessitarianism of Hobbes; instead, it is through occasionalism that Edwards rescinds Arminianism.
American intellectual and historian Perry Miller claimed in 1949 that Jonathan Edwards followed a Lockean approach to his refutation against Arminianism. Locke undoubtedly influenced Edwards, as Edwards explicitly states his intrigue when reading Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. Locke's naturalistic philosophy helped Edwards frame the supernatural and "divine element" of God and free will to a more "naturalized" and integrated view of the world. Edwards found his starting point in Locke's understanding of the will, only to expand further with contributing thoughts from the influence of others such as Hobbes, Collins and Cambridge Platonists. Edwards takes an priori position contrary to Lockean philosophy and experimentalism, asserting that theory and knowledge are obtained only through experience.
Edwards will establish his refutation of libertarianism by breaking down the Arminian position into three parts: (1) self-determining power, (2) indifference, and (3) contingence. Arminianism affirms humanity's power and will above the authority and sovereignty of God. Edwards first emphasizes the instability of the Arminian position by stating, "either the Arminian is saying something self-contradictory; or he is without acknowledging it, in agreement with the Calvinist." He asserts that Arminians and Calvinists begin on the mutual understanding that humans possess the power to will in the sense of taking action of the will. Through Locke, Edwards establishes that the differences in action lie in the motivations and causes. For the Calvinist, all choices are influenced by the choice prior to it and originate in the "first act." Locke will address the power of suspension, but Edwards will refute this notion as this act has no freedom; it simply elongates the inevitable.
Libertarianism claims "that a free act does not have a cause;" however, according to Edwards, the will cannot remain neutral, nor can it "equally prefer" two options, as stated by Isaac Watts, as there would be no purpose in determination. As Hume and Kames further the notion of "feelings of indifference," Edwards will refute the claims asserting the incoherence, "for they would be giving an account of some ground of the existence of a thing when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground of its existence." Like Hobbes and Collins, Edwards will affirm causal relation – that the cause will entirely determine the effect; this notion has no partiality. Clarke and Edwards also agree that human choice only occurs through prior understandings influencing motives, as Edwards believes "indifference, without motives, is incoherent." Edwards will, in part, agree with some notions within necessitarianism, the principle that the will is determined by prior events, decisions and choices.
Edwards emphasizes the distinction between moral and natural causes while preserving moral responsibility, which is also found in Hobbes's position. He furthers Hobbes's claim that the influence of all causes is in the imperfection of human nature, and natural philosophy has a basis for the effects of original sin. Though Hobbes claims God is remote and will ignore human suffering, Edwards contrarily establishes God's active work in humanity. The inconsistencies in Hobbes and Edwards lead Harris to believe Edwards would instead identify as an occasionalist like Berkeley. While the predominant philosophers in 18th-century Britain sought to establish thought outside the paradigm of God, divinity, and tradition, Edwards asserts that everything is dependent on divine will, and humans are inherently reliant on God. He sought to increase humanity's reliance on the grace of God, emphasizing man's original sin and the "active force" and providence of God.
Harris does an exceptional job of extracting Edwards’s ideas and contrasting them with other philosophers of his time. Harris is well versed in the array of perspectives and figures of 18th-century philosophers in Britain, especially Locke, Hume and Descartes, and others such as Kames, Berkeley, and Wesley. A focal point is placed on Locke’s experimentalism, as Harris’ overarching theme of his book, Of Liberty and Necessity, constructs a theory that the 18th-century British understanding of free will largely depends on human experience. However, although Locke influences Edwards’ philosophy, Harris concludes that Edwards’ position is vastly different from the notion of experimentalism. Harris continues to establish that Edwards is also not compatible with Hobbes and states in passing that Edwards is much more similar to Berkeley but fails to further expand on their commonalities. It would benefit the reader to learn more about Berkeley and the occasionalist notion, as Harris states that Edwards’s philosophy aligns here.
Furthermore, unlike the philosophers at the time (such as Price, Beattie, Reid, and Stewart), who did not care to engage with Edwards’ arguments, Harris asserts Edwards’ position as “such a powerful one,” worthy of an address by his contemporaries. Harris resolutely interacts and analyzes Edwards’s notion against Arminianism, correcting authors such as Miller and his appeal to label Edwards simply as Lockean. Given Harris’s knowledge of the philosophical positions of the 18th-century, this invites the question of how he would suppose the predominant philosophers would engage with Edwards’s arguments and defend their positions. Overall, Harris’ comprehensive analysis of 18th-century British phiilosophers provides a robust presentation of the contributing philosophies and unique position Edwards held against
Sources:
Edwards, Jonathan. A careful and strict Enquiry into The modern prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, Which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame, edited by Paul Ramsey.
Harris, James A. “Jonathan Edwards against Arminianism.” In Of Liberty and Necessity.
Edwards, Jonathan. A careful and strict Enquiry into The modern prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, Which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame, edited by Paul Ramsey.
Harris, James A. “Jonathan Edwards against Arminianism.” In Of Liberty and Necessity.
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